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About the Gettysburg Social Sciences Review 
 
The Gettysburg Social Sciences Review (GSSR) was started in 2017 
by Miranda Wisor ‘17 as a place to showcase the excellent work of 
undergraduate students in the social sciences at colleges and 
universities across the world. The journal is unique in that it is 
authored, reviewed, and edited completely by undergraduate students, 
tapping into the wealth of knowledge generated at the undergraduate 
level. While the GSSR is maintained by Gettysburg College, 
submissions are also encouraged and welcomed from students outside 
the College.  
 
The Gettysburg Social Sciences Review is housed in the Cupola, the 
Gettysburg College online repository for academic work. Currently, 
the Cupola maintains six specific academic journals in addition to a 
plethora of student- and faculty-authored works. As an open-access 
platform that aims to promote the exchange of ideas and equal access 
opportunities in academia, all published work can be downloaded free 
of charge. Although all the College’s journals are now housed in the 
Cupola, the GSSR was the first to be born entirely digital, making it 
an even more exciting undertaking as we continue to expand in the 
future. 
 
This publication marks the second edition of the third volume of the 
Gettysburg Social Sciences Review to be published to date. Since the 
spring of 2020, the Gettysburg Social Sciences Review has reached 
over 2,406 downloads from 295+ institutions across 75+ countries. 
With this volume, 29 total works have been published since 2017.  
 
The editors of the Gettysburg Social Sciences Review would like to 
acknowledge the following individuals and departments for their 
continuous efforts that support the growth of the journal: the 
Sociology department at Gettysburg College; faculty sponsor 
Professor VoonChin Phua; Sarah Appedu, Mary Elmquist, and the 
library staff for their technical expertise and passion for showcasing 
undergraduate work; and Gettysburg College, for promoting 
undergraduate research endeavors and supporting the Cupola as an 
open-access repository.  
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Abstract: Michel Foucault is well-known for his theorizations of 
institutional power, normativity, and biopolitics. Less well-known 
was the fact that Foucault developed his analysis of biopolitics in and 
through his historical investigation of neoliberalism. While critique 
of neoliberalism has today become a commonplace of humanities 
discourse and popular resistance to neoliberalization proliferates 
globally, it remains unclear that the historical specificity of 
neoliberalism is widely understood. In particular, the distinction 
between classical liberalism and neoliberal governance tends to 
dissolve in popular discourse. This paper followed Foucault in tracing 
the historical emergence of neoliberalism from the classical 
liberalism of the eighteenth century, attending to the continuities, as 
well as the radical discontinuities between these political forms. 
Particular attention was given to the history of neoliberalism in its 
German and American variants. Because neoliberalism characterized 
the governmental and economic reason and practice of late modernity, 
recalling Foucault’s analysis prepared us to understand and engage 
the social, political, and economic conjunctures reverberating 
throughout the world today. 
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Introduction  
 Michel Foucault dedicated his 1977-1978 lectures at the 
Collège de France to the genealogy of modern governmental reason 
and practice. In these lectures, Foucault famously used the term 
“governmentality” to broadly define methods of governance, 
administration, and direction, as well as the formations of knowledge 
which render governing possible (Foucault 2009:109). 
Governmentality names a network of discourses and practices; these 
may have fostered the productive and quasi-scientific administrative 
management of population, which Foucault termed “biopolitics,” or 
more explicitly coercive and repressive modalities of power (Foucault 
2010:22). From 1978-1979, Foucault pivoted his focus to the 
contemporary world, analyzing a neoliberal governmentality first 
articulated in the 1930s and developed in Europe and the United 
States through the postwar period. Foucault was often remembered 
for his theorization of “bio-power,” or those forms of governance and 
administration which grasp populations and manage individuals 
insofar as they are living beings (Foucault 1978:144). Yet it was often 
forgotten that Foucault developed his analysis of biopolitics in and 
through his historical investigation of neoliberal government and the 
mechanisms of security which sustain it. In addition to illuminating 
the political landscape of our contemporary world, recalling 
Foucault’s lectures on neoliberalism shed significant light on more 
well-known aspects of his philosophical legacy. 
 Today, critique of neoliberalism has become a staple of 
humanities discourse, and popular resistance to neoliberalization 
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proliferates globally.1 However, it remained unclear that the historical 
specificity of neoliberalism was widely understood; in particular, the 
distinction between classical liberalism and neoliberal governance 
has a tendency to dissolve in popular discourse. As a result, 
neoliberalism was widely misconstrued as a simple extension of the 
free market. Foucault’s landmark analysis destabilized this view, 
demonstrating that neoliberalism was irreducible to an augmented 
liberalism appropriate to the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries: it was something more. This paper followed Foucault in 
tracing the historical emergence of neoliberalism from the classical 
liberalism of the eighteenth century, attending to the continuities, as 
well as the radical discontinuities between these political forms. 
Beginning with a detailed exposition of Foucault’s analysis of 
eighteenth-century liberalism and its emergence from earlier 
formations of state politics, I charted Foucault’s genealogy of 
neoliberalism in its early (German) and later (American) variants. 
Because neoliberalism characterized the governmental and economic 
reason and practice of late-modernity, Foucault’s analysis prepared 
 
1 See, e.g., Brown, Wendy, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution 
(2017); Harcourt, Bernard, The Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment and the Myth of 
Natural Order (2011); or the 2013 special edition of SocialText, “Genres of 
Neoliberalism.” Examples of global popular resistance are numerous. If the 
privatization of public goods represents a constitutive feature of neoliberalism, then the 
2018 struggle against education privatization in Puerto Rico may serve as one example 
of such resistance. Likewise, the movement against prison privatization in the United 
States can fruitfully be viewed through the prism of resistance to neoliberalism: see, 
e.g., Wang, Jackie, Carceral Capitalism (2018). 
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us to understand and engage the social, political, and economic 
conjunctures reverberating throughout the world today.  
 
1. The Emergence of a Liberal Governmentality 
 To contextualize a discussion of neoliberalism, it was worth 
considering, first, the historical conditions under which liberalism 
emerged, as well as the formations of governmental practice which 
preceded it. First, a provisional and rather general definition of 
liberalism may help orient the reader. Liberalism tended to define 
individuals as rights-bearing subjects who are formally equal before 
the law. Often, liberal sovereignty was understood to emanate from 
the governed themselves, hence some form of democratic politics 
commonly accompanied a liberal state. Perhaps more pertinent to the 
present investigation, liberalism implied an economic order which 
presupposed the irreducibility or naturalness of relations of private 
property ownership. Such relations assumed their meaning and 
import in a marketplace unencumbered by external elements, for 
instance the state. In the market, the law of equal exchange 
preponderated. While the organizational and conceptual features of 
liberalism will be analyzed in greater detail in the following section, 
here I examined the conditions of liberalism’s historical emergence.  
The mid-eighteenth century saw a new formation of liberal 
government beginning to take shape against the backdrop of a rigid 
police state which had been erected throughout Europe from the 
sixteenth through the eighteenth century. In the police states which 
dominated early modern Europe, sovereign power was exercised in 
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the form of direct intervention at every level of the economy. Policy 
emphasized favorable competition between states, which was 
achieved through the attenuation of imperial objectives in the 
international sphere, counterbalanced by a domestic policy of near 
total control over production, circulation, and the conduct of citizens 
in general. As the dream of a single, absolutely dominant empire 
receded, European states began to acknowledge that economic 
competition must be kept within reasonable limits to maintain 
international stability. A legalistic sovereignty of command, 
mercantilist economic policy, an ethos of European balance in 
international trade and relations, and a domestic police state: such 
were the general characteristics of the formations of governmental 
reason and practice which proliferated in Europe from the sixteenth 
to the eighteenth century, on Foucault’s account.  
 The emergence of a science of political economy in the late 
eighteenth century formed a substantive development in the transition 
which swept away previous formations of raison d’état, ushering in a 
distinctively liberal governmentality. While continuing to emphasize 
favorable inter-state competition, political economy opened a 
discursive space in which governmental practice could no longer take 
the shape of unchecked edict, fiat, and command. Approaching the 
market as a set of “phenomena, processes, and regularities” which 
occurred naturally and intelligibly, and which could be hampered or 
allowed to unfold unimpeded by governmental practices, classical 
political economy unearthed “a certain naturalness specific to the 
practice of government itself” (Foucault 2010:15). Henceforth, 
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governmental practices could be successes or failures vis-a-vis the 
natural phenomena and dynamics which were their objects. Like all 
others, the sovereign was subject to the natural laws which reign in 
the market.  
 Broadly, eighteenth century political economy asserted that 
natural market mechanisms, left to their own devices, would produce 
a “true” price: a price which accurately demonstrated the 
“relationship between the cost of production and the extent of demand” 
(Foucault 2010:30). According to Foucault, a new “regime of truth” 
was opened, wherein the market acted as a “site of veridiction” for 
governmental practice (Foucault 2010:18, 32). Governmental 
practice could be evaluated correlative to the market and deemed 
inapt if it disrupted the production of true prices. Thus, a matrix of 
success and failure supplanted a juridical matrix of sovereign 
command in governmental practice. In light of the revelations of 
political economy, which indicated that the economic field required 
limited intervention, the sixteenth and seventeenth century police 
states were gradually replaced by a governmentality whose 
fundamental principle was that of the “self-limitation of government” 
(Foucault 2010:19).  
 
2. The Art of Least Possible Government 
 Understanding the conditions of liberalism’s emergence 
prepares us to understand what was historically unique about a liberal 
political order. Earlier formations of raison d’état had addressed 
themselves to the question of how best to organize and govern a state, 
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or how to institute and elaborate a regime of governance which would 
be dense, rigid, and more or less total. The scientific revelations of 
eighteenth-century political economy, however, called for limited 
intervention in the natural production of true prices. A liberal 
governmentality was born, which understood itself in terms of a new 
network of questions: how little can one govern? where is 
governmental intervention necessary? where can it be abandoned? In 
the formulation of these questions by political economists, and the 
responses offered by jurists, advisors, reformers and revolutionists, 
one can discern the emergence of an unprecedented liberal 
governmentality, or what Foucault calls “the art of the least possible 
government” (Foucault 2010:28). 
 Throughout the period of early liberalization, calls for the 
curtailment of government intervention came from several angles. 
Diverse justifications were employed. Today, a particular tendency is 
emphasized in the narration of liberalism; liberal government is most 
often understood in terms of the irreducibility of human freedom, the 
necessity of political emancipation and organization on the basis of 
natural rights, in short, a whole liberalistic theory of human nature. 
Not controversially, Foucault linked this tendency to the thought of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, a great humanist and a champion of 
eighteenth-century political liberalism. Against the Rousseauist 
tendency, Foucault distinguished those calls for limited government 
which issued, not from the mouths of humanist revolutionists and 
reformers, but from the scientific revelations of political economy. 
These, he argues, have had the most consequential and enduring 
12 
 
political effects, and bear the most forcefully on our modernity. 
Foucault organized his analysis around three key conceptual 
innovations which undergirded the sort of liberalization demanded by 
political economy. These concepts, which this section addressed in 
turn, are the market, utility, and the principle of collective enrichment.  
The classical political economists of the eighteenth century 
argued that the market must be allowed to function according to the 
natural laws by which it was governed. Such a natural order demands 
an ethos of minimum governmental intervention. Doubtless, many 
observations could be made concerning the diverse currents in 
eighteenth-century thought which coincided with this view: the 
apprehension of a certain naturalness which could be understood but 
could not be subjected to an alien authority, the development of the 
human sciences and natural history, deism, or the reinterpretation of 
god as a transcendent being who, for all that, did not intervene in the 
world human affairs. Liberalism, as Foucault saw it, developed as the 
governmental rationality suitable to such a world: a new 
governmentality whose principle was its own self-limitation, 
observing the dictates of the market forces unearthed by the science 
of political economy.  
If classical economy could be said to organize itself around 
a single concept or principle, it was doubtless exchange. As Foucault 
noted, the market was here defined by “free exchange between two 
[parties] who through this exchange establish the equivalence of two 
values” (Foucault 2010:118). That was to say, in classical economy, 
two values were determined to be equivalent insofar as they could be 
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exchanged for one another by free actors in a market unencumbered 
by external forces. On this view, the state should not intervene in the 
market or the process of exchange, except to guarantee that the 
freedom of both parties to exchange value for value was respected. 
The state’s principle role, then, was not within the market as a site of 
exchange, but rather outside the market, at the site of production: the 
state provided the institutional framework which guaranteed the 
“necessity of private property for production” (Foucault 2010:118). 
The market itself was governed by natural laws of equivalent 
exchange, was defined as a space of freedom, and must be uninhibited 
by governmental practice.  
 In the mid-eighteenth century, two general models existed 
for establishing and fixing the limits of the art of least possible 
government. As we have seen, Rousseauism sought to define the 
natural rights of political subjects and analyze the social contract by 
means of which some rights are transferred to the sovereign and 
others are deemed inalienable. Such an analysis would determine the 
maximum limit of acceptable governmental intrusion into the 
individual affairs of political subjects. Beyond this limit, power would 
be illegitimate. Against the Rousseauist tendency, Foucault 
distinguished a utilitarian project, which was liked more closely in his 
view to the demands of classical economy. Utilitarianism endeavors 
to determine where government must apply itself; when; in what 
manner; and to what extent. Where was government useful? 
Conversely, utility will determine where governmental intervention 
was ineffective, detrimental, or useless. Such analysis determined the 
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minimum limit of necessary government, directing government to its 
most useful points of application, while “continually questioning 
government […] as to its utility or non-utility” (Foucault 2010:41).  
The principle of utility in governmental practice, informed 
by reflection and analysis of the market, dictates that government 
limit its action not out of “respect for the freedom of individuals,” but 
rather based on the “evidence of economic analysis which it knows 
has to be respected” (Foucault 2010:62). In Foucault’s view, 
utilitarianism has “stood fast” while Rousseauism has “receded” 
(Foucault 2010:43). Despite the fact that Rousseauist avowals of 
human liberty remained a persistent feature of the dominant political 
narrative in the neoliberal period, it was the utilitarian, rather than the 
Rousseauist tendency of classical liberalism which formed a key 
element in the genealogy of neoliberal government, according to 
Foucault. Indeed, as the fourth section of this paper will illustrate, 
economic calculation and evaluation continued to dictate government 
intervention and non-intervention in the contemporary neoliberal 
state. 
 Alongside the principle of the market and the principle of 
utility, Foucault emphasized a principle of collective enrichment 
characteristic of classical political economy. Prior to the emergence 
of liberalism, mercantilist economic analysis had figured economic 
activity in a zero-sum manner. On this view, one actor’s enrichment 
was necessarily realized at another’s expense, and economic activity 
can in no way maximize the wealth of all parties. Classical 
economists, on the other hand, argued that in a marketplace based on 
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free exchange, all parties benefit through the pursuit of their own 
interests, when they exchange value for value, thereby establishing 
equivalence. Because each party freely exchanged something of less 
for something of greater utility, all parties to exchange are 
beneficiaries. In a like manner, Foucault argued that “Europe as a 
collective subject” emerges in economic reflection in the late 
eighteenth century, as classical economists projected that Europe 
would become rich “en bloc” through the mechanism of competition 
between states, which maximizes utility for all (Foucault 2010:54). 
Where mercantilism suggested protectionist, economics based on an 
insulated national economy, classical economists stressed free trade 
as a vehicle for collective enrichment.2  
 
3. Administering Liberalism 
 Liberalism emerged in response to the revelations of 
political economy, instituting a general laissez-faire policy as 
concerns the market. And yet, despite this laissez-faire policy, 
Foucault rejected the view that liberalism constitutes a regime in 
which subjects enjoy quantitatively more or less freedom than they 
do or did under other organizations of power. For Foucault, to adopt 
this view would be to treat something abstract and relative—
freedom—as if it were a quantifiable absolute. It was Foucault’s view 
 
2 It is evident that the classical stress laid on free trade persists to this day, and in general 
remains an important feature of the neoliberal order. Interestingly, some commentators 
have noted that the recent resurgence of nationalist, protectionist international 
economic policy gestures towards a return to the outmoded views of the mercantilists 
(Nelson 2019).  
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that liberalism constitutes itself through a “productive/destructive 
relationship [with] freedom” (Foucault 2010:64). To be sure, 
liberalism required certain conditions of freedom to be met: those of 
the market, exchange, etc. Yet in circumscribing the field in which 
such freedoms could obtain, a liberal governmentality must establish 
“limitations, controls, forms of coercion and obligation” which fix the 
limits of freedom (Foucault 2010:64). Hence, liberalism could be said 
to both “produce” and “consume” freedom. (Foucault 2010:63, 65). 
Rather than being “a given […] which has to be respected,” Foucault 
argued that we should understand freedom as the necessary minimum 
condition which must be produced and sustained in order for 
liberalism to function (Foucault 2010:65). Political liberties were not 
natural facts or pre-political givens which governmental practice was 
tasked to observe. Rather, such liberties were “object-effects” of a 
given arrangement of discourses and practices instituted under 
liberalism and sustained through its elaboration (Foucault 1979:305). 
 More concretely, it was evident that the institution of a 
market economy whose principle is free exchange required the 
preservation of the collective interest against the corrosive impacts of 
the interests of individuals, while on the other hand the interests of 
individuals must be left relatively unencumbered, such that market 
mechanisms can function in a natural way. Liberal governmentality 
thus exhibited a bipolar character, tending on the one hand towards 
collectivist tyranny, and on the other towards anarchic individualism. 
The conditions of freedom which were requisite to the liberal order 
required constant supervision, maintenance, readjustment, and 
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organization. This lead Foucault to conclude that, rather than 
instituting a regime of increased freedom in an abstract sense, 
liberalism represented a transition from the police state to the security 
state.  
In Security, Territory, Population (2009), Foucault 
juxtaposed apparatuses of security to juridical institutions and 
disciplinary regimes. Juridical institutions addressed subjects with 
legal commands and interdictions in a formal, linear relay topped by 
a central authority or sovereign. Disciplinary regimes managed 
individuals at the level of the body, through a diffuse yet rigid “micro-
physics of power” invested in networked institutions such as prisons, 
schools, and hospitals (Foucault 1979:26). Security apparatuses, on 
the other hand, are directed towards the collection of statistical data 
concerning population and natural phenomena, and the use of such 
data towards the implementation and refinement of programs 
intended to manage and direct general forces to produce optimal 
outcomes. Security apparatuses measure probabilities, calculate cost, 
risk, and benefit, establish averages and set the limits of acceptable 
excess, rather than focusing on meticulous or rigid control.  
Security measures may be difficult to recognize as such, for 
the very reason that they constituted the overall fabric of government 
and administration to which we were accustomed. Foucault’s project 
hinged on revealing this fact in its radical historical particularity. 
Security has not always operated as the dominant mode of 
government: it emerged in large part with the eighteenth-century art 
of least possible government. Security apparatuses managed the 
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economy of freedom instituted in the liberal order. Foucault specified: 
“the problem of security is the protection of the collective interest 
against individual interests,” and vice versa (Foucault 2010:65). The 
economy of power instituted under liberalism was a site of constant 
play between the freedoms required for liberalism’s operation and the 
management of risks which attend those freedoms. Such management 
cannot be rigid and total, but must remain flexible and probabilistic. 
It was the task par excellence of security. Notably, security 
apparatuses continued to organize the neoliberal governmentality of 
the present. 
 The institution and maintenance of security apparatuses, 
disciplinary techniques, and juridical institutions, all of which were 
required in some measure for liberalism’s optimal performance, 
demanded a “culture of danger” to proliferate within a liberal regime: 
individuals were “conditioned to experience their situation, their life, 
their present, and their future as containing danger” (Foucault 
2010:66f). In Foucault’s view, the production and manipulation of 
fear was a precondition of the liberal order, or its “internal 
psychological and cultural correlative” (Foucault 2010:67). Only 
when faced with constant and multiple risks will subjects conditioned 
to esteem freedom accept the curtailments of freedom which 
liberalism paradoxically required. Producing certain freedoms while 
maintaining others at an optimal level, countervailing their attendant 
risks and justifying their consumption: such are the complex tasks of 
liberal governmentality. 
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 Doubtless, one could emphasize other features of liberalism 
than those highlighted by Foucault. His analysis was not intended to 
be exhaustive. Rather, following a “genealogical” protocol, he 
highlighted specific features of classical liberalism which bear on 
contemporary regimes of governmentality, illuminating lines of 
continuity and discontinuity between liberal and neoliberal 
arrangements of political and economic discourse and practice 
(Foucault 1984:76). Insofar as it formed a link in the genealogy of 
neoliberal government, classical liberalism was a formation of power 
and knowledge which analyzed its programs in terms of their utility 
rather than their legitimacy, where utility was verified through effects 
on a market whose principle was exchange and whose requisite was 
limited intervention. Liberalism approached exchange as a vehicle for 
collective enrichment, a principle which holds for inter-state 
competition in the context of a world market. It produced and 
consumed freedom, that is, it instituted and arranged an economy of 
liberties, organizing this economy through apparatuses of security 
and a culture of danger augmented by discipline and surveillance. 
Strikingly prescient in today’s political landscape, Foucault’s remarks 
remind us that, if the neoliberal era was in fact distinct from the epoch 
of classical liberalism, certain elements of a liberal governmentality 
remained persistent features of the neoliberal order. 
 
4. Neoliberalism  
 The emergence and development of a complex social 
formation such as neoliberalism could not be reduced to a unilinear 
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narrative of “progress” (Foucault 1984:85). Its line of descent was 
fractured and multiple, combining an array of antecedent forces in a 
novel way. Nor was neoliberalism itself homogenous, as if it emerged 
in a single gesture, fully formed. Foucault’s genealogy distinguished 
between two major variants in neoliberalism. The first arose in 
Germany during the period of post-World War II reconstruction and 
developed through a critique of National Socialist economic and 
social policy. The second, American variant of neoliberalism defined 
itself in reaction to New Deal interventionism implemented in the 
wake of the Great Depression. While both tendencies reflected a 
reaction against interventionist economic policy, there were 
important historical and conceptual distinctions to be made between 
German and American neoliberalism. This section reconstructed 
Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism in its German and American 
forms, emphasizing those features of neoliberal governmentality 
which bear most forcefully on our historical present. 
 
4.1. German Neoliberalism 
 In the wake of World War II, many European states were 
employing Keynesian economic policies. An eminent twentieth-
century British economist, John Maynard Keynes advocated for 
government intervention, specifically active fiscal and monetary 
policies, to help mitigate the deleterious effects of recession and 
inflation. Needless to say, interventions of the sort proposed by 
Keynes seriously contradicted the liberal ethos of minimal economic 
intervention. According to Foucault, the Keynesian interventionism 
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implemented in postwar Germany had three general objectives: 
infrastructural reconstruction, economic stabilization via planning, 
and social objectives considered “indispensable in order to avoid the 
renewal of fascism and Nazism” (Foucault 2010:80). German 
neoliberalism arose in reaction to Keynesian intervention, which was 
seen by German neoliberals as symptomatic of the very forces which 
had produced National Socialism.  
 The general social and economic causes of the Third Reich’s 
rise were topics of unparalleled intellectual import in postwar 
Germany. Foucault located the intellectual fountainhead of German 
neoliberalism in the Freiburg School, where economists endeavored 
to resolve—within the framework of capitalist production—the 
“irrational rationality of capitalism” (Foucault 2010:105). This 
economic irrationality, it was feared, had social consequences that 
may have contributed to the rise of the Third Reich. According to the 
Freiburg School economists, the economic policy of the Third Reich 
represented the consolidation of numerous undesirable elements 
culled from Germany’s modern history; it brought together 
“protectionist economics, the economics of state aid, the planned 
economy, and Keynesian economics” (Foucault 2010:109). Because 
they contradicted the basic premises of a free market, these policies 
rendered irrational the rationality of a free market. Further, if these 
economic elements had ushered in the Third Reich, then their utter 
liquidation, and not their re-implementation in the interest of 
reconstruction, would be required to prevent the re-emergence of 
fascism.  
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The birth of German neoliberalism in Freiburg could be 
counterposed to simultaneous attempts by Western Marxists to 
challenge the basic logic of capital and its accumulation. Such efforts 
were exemplified by critical theorists of the Frankfurt School, whose 
work frequently gesture towards social, cultural, and aesthetic 
subversion of capitalist relations, emphasizing the pervasive and 
injurious effects of Enlightenment “instrumental reason” 
(Horkheimer and Adorno 2001:237). The German neoliberals, on the 
other hand, endeavored to redefine and buttress the economic 
rationality of capitalist production, while avoiding the social 
irrationality which had surged under National Socialism. They 
accepted some key elements of the Western Marxist critique of a 
consumer society composed of alienated, atomized individuals, yet 
they typically view this polemic as misdirected. Where critical theory 
attributed the virulent “leveling” of the social fabric to the corrosive 
impacts of capitalism, the neoliberals of the Freiburg School 
attributed the same afflictions to illiberalism and a society which “has 
chosen a policy of protectionism and planning in which the market 
does not perform its function and in which the state […] takes 
responsibility for the everyday life of individuals” (Horkheimer and 
Adorno 2001:9; Foucault 2010:114). For the Freiburg School 
neoliberals, the social irrationality which spawned the Third Reich 
could be attributed to the dominant role played by the state, where 
critical theory found in the same irrationality only the evidence of 
capitalist exploitation and abstraction.  
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 For the neoliberals of the Freiburg School, National 
Socialism should not be misconstrued as the apotheosis of 
Enlightenment instrumental reason, nor as an exaggeration of the 
general social form assumed by late capitalism. Rather, National 
Socialism offered a vivid illustration of the natural link between the 
economic antecedents it combined: protectionist economics, the 
economics of state aid, the planned economy, and Keynesianism. 
According to Foucault, the “coup de force” of the Freiburg school is 
the notion that each of these economic strategies are “linked to each 
other[,] and if you adopt one of them you will not escape the other 
three” (Foucault 2010:110). The Freiburg School effectively drew an 
internal link between any sort of interventionist policy whatsoever 
and National Socialism. The conclusion naturally drawn by the 
German neoliberals was to abandon economic intervention in all its 
forms. 
 As the German state attempted to reconstitute itself in the 
wake of the Third Reich, neoliberal advising led the nascent West 
German Republic to ground its sovereignty in the voluntary attraction 
of economic subjects to an institutional framework which guaranteed 
a space of economic freedom, i.e., a free market. This was, in 
Foucault’s words, the “legitimizing foundation of the state on the 
guaranteed exercise of an economic freedom” (Foucault 2010:82f). 
By accepting the legitimacy and desirability of the particular sort of 
economic freedom guaranteed by the state, economic subjects 
“produce a […] political consensus” concerning the state itself 
(Foucault 2010:85). If this is so, then favorable economic 
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performance—evidenced in a strong currency and a favorable rate of 
growth—became an indicator of the legitimacy and good governance 
of the state. In postwar Germany, then, “the economy produces 
political signs that enable the structures, mechanisms, and 
justifications of power to function” (Foucault 2010:85). The German 
neoliberal state was, according to Foucault, a “radically economic” 
state: its sovereignty is founded upon the consensus of subjects to 
participate in a space of freedom opened by the economic institution 
of the market (Foucault 2010:86).  
Clearly, this neoliberal formation diverged sharply from a 
Rousseauist political liberalism founded upon the assertion of natural 
rights and the primacy of human liberty. Rather than sovereignty 
emanating from a social contract among the governed, in postwar 
Germany the economy itself “produces sovereignty,” that is, “the 
economy produces legitimacy for the state that is its guarantor” 
(Foucault 2010:84). Classical political liberalism began with a 
legitimate state and endeavored to produce a space of economic 
freedom therefrom. German neoliberalism, on the other hand, founds 
the state as the guarantor of a space of economic freedom. German 
neoliberalism was opposed to classical liberalism, then, insofar as the 
neoliberal state followed from the free market, rather than the free 
market following from the legitimate state. Because economic 
indicators authorized state sovereignty in this neoliberal order, 
Foucault could rightly remark that the neoliberal state is a “state under 
the supervision of the market, rather than a market supervised by the 
state” (Foucault 2010:116).  
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 If the neoliberal state found itself under the market’s 
supervision, it must also be noted that the basic principle of the market 
under neoliberalism was not that of the classical economists. As we 
have seen, classical economy theorized the market as a space of 
exchange defined by equivalence. Under neoliberalism, the market’s 
basic principle was not equivalent exchange, but competition. This 
pivot from exchange to competition constituted a radical 
discontinuity between classical and neoliberalism. Yet, as Foucault 
noted, this shift was not a novelty of the twentieth century. It was 
traceable to the nineteenth, constituting an important channel in 
neoliberalism’s genealogy. In the nineteenth century, liberal 
economists had already begun to figure the market as a site of 
competition, a space ruled “not [by] equivalency [as in a market based 
on exchange] but on the contrary inequality” (Foucault 2010:119). It 
was competition, and not exchange, which guaranteed economic 
rationality, insofar as competition itself conditions exchange. The 
inevitable presence of competition provided the guarantee that values 
produced in exchange will be determined, not by individual parties 
themselves, but by market forces in general. Competition’s presence 
influenced and, in a sense, determined the process through which the 
formation of equivalent value occurs. Still, the liberal economists of 
the nineteenth century continued to view market competition as a 
natural dynamic, requiring nonintervention. Whether the 
fundamental conceptual dyad of the market was exchange-equality, 
as in early classical analysis, or competition-inequality, as in the 
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nineteenth century, the practical implication is a policy of laissez-
faire.  
 It was on this point that the neoliberals of the Freiburg 
School articulate a radical break with earlier liberal economists. 
While they, too, saw competition as the fundamental principle of the 
market, they envisioned competition not as a “natural datum” but 
rather as a “formal structure” which “will only appear and produce its 
effects under certain conditions which have to be carefully and 
artificially constructed” (Foucault 2010:120). Competition, then, was 
an objective of governmental reason and practice, not a natural 
phenomenon which must be left unimpeded. The mechanism of 
competition, as the root principle of the market in German neoliberal 
thought, was guaranteed by governmental praxis and the juridical 
order. As Foucault noted, the juridical here “gives form to the 
economic,” by setting the conditions in which the competitive 
mechanism of the market could operate (Foucault 2010:162). The role 
of government was to facilitate the market, to produce the conditions 
under which the market’s basic principle, competition, could operate. 
Neoliberalism should by no means be conflated with a laissez-faire 
liberalism. It must be identified with “permanent vigilance, activity, 
and intervention” at the level of a governmental practice whose role 
was to guarantee the necessary conditions deemed optimal for a 
market based on competition (Foucault 2010:132). 
 Because the German neoliberals emphasized a deregulated 
economy, any “vigilance, activity, and intervention” on the part of the 
state must not introduce constraints or regulation on the market itself, 
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in the forms of “price control, support for a particular sector of the 
market, systematic job creation, or public investment” (Foucault 
2010:132, 139). Rather, a continuous and multilateral governmental 
intervention must be directed at the antecedent conditions of the 
market. In other words, intervention and regulation by the state must 
be manifested in formal structures, rather than direct initiatives with 
specific objectives, as in the case of a planned economy. Neoliberal 
formal intervention was described by Foucault in terms of a 
regulatory architecture applied to game whose outcome cannot be 
known in advance. Government could not endeavor to produce 
specific outcomes in specific sectors or within particular elements of 
the economy. It must adopt policies which optimize the general 
conditions of the free market—first among them, competition. Here, 
the logic of security intersected with neoliberal governance, in 
contradistinction to a more rigid disciplinary architecture 
characteristic of state planning. Neoliberal governmentality targeted 
elements outside the market, specifically those elements which 
functioned as the preconditions for the market’s operation.  
According to Foucault, a key objective of German neoliberal 
policy was price stability, which was achieved through controls on 
inflation and the rate of interest. Price stability, however, was only a 
means; its end was economic growth. Economic growth as an end in 
itself could be considered the objective par excellence of German 
neoliberalism. Full employment, on the other hand, was not an 
objective of German neoliberal policy. It had been for Keynes and his 
disciples; but in the view of the German neoliberals, regulations to 
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produce full employment constituted destructive interventions in the 
market, subverting the mechanism of competition. In general, social 
rather than economic activity became the target of governmental 
intervention. For instance, agricultural production was not regulated 
directly, via price controls or subsidies, but indirectly, through 
security measures such as the encouragement of desirable flows of 
population from one region or sector to another, the proliferation and 
distribution of technical instruments and innovations, the production 
of knowledge, and the organization of training. Where direct 
governmental intervention in the economy itself must be light, 
intervention must be dense and consistent at the level of a population 
which was grasped as the market’s condition of existence. 
 At the level of social policy, German neoliberalism 
positioned itself against all strategies, tactics, and objectives 
associated with Keynesianism. As Foucault noted, Keynesian social 
policy emphasized all subjects having “relatively equal access to 
consumer goods” (Foucault 2010:142). This implied redistributive 
measure aimed at an average deemed optimal for market consumption. 
For the neoliberals of the Freiburg School, on the other hand, a social 
policy which emphasized equalization undermines the mechanism of 
competition which organizes the market. Further, redistributive social 
policy which attempted to produce conditions of equality risks 
transferring “the part of income that generates savings and investment” 
to another sector of the population, to be used for consumption. 
Rather than equality, inequality within acceptable parameters must be 
an objective of neoliberal governmentality, since it was precisely 
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inequality which sustained competition. The maximum acceptable 
redistributive intervention will be the transfer of a portion of income 
which would be used for “over-consumption” in one sector to 
members of the population who “find themselves in a state of under-
consumption” because of permanent or temporary disability 
(Foucault 2010:143). Redistributive measures were in short strictly 
exceptional, and an emphasis on the inequality requisite for economic 
competition was pushed to the foreground. 
 A final exemplary feature of German neoliberal social policy 
was privatization rather than socialization or collectivization of the 
insurance against risk. For the economists of the Freiburg School, 
social policy should above all foreground economic growth, which 
would allow individuals “to achieve a level of income that will allow 
them the […] individual or familial [capital] with which to absorb 
risks” (Foucault 2010:144). On this view, growth would render 
collectivized insurance, and social support programs more generally, 
unnecessary; privatized and individualized social policy was a 
cornerstone of neoliberal governmentality tout court, which in part 
explained the conventional wisdom which associated neoliberalism 
with “small” government. Notably, while moderate socialization of 
insurance against risk has come to characterize many European liberal 
democracies, the contemporary politics of the United States remained 
firmly rooted in the neoliberal principle of privatized insurance 
described by Foucault.  
 In summary, German neoliberal policy emphasized growth 
through non-intervention in the market. State sovereignty was rooted 
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in the economic and evaluated in economic terms. The market was 
organized around the principle of competition, understood as an 
artificial structure which must be maintained, rather than as a natural 
force. Despite its extreme emphasis on non-intervention in the market, 
neoliberalism should not be conflated with non-interventionism 
generally; rather, German neoliberal governmentality—which posits 
an immanent link between any sort of economic interventionist policy 
and authoritarianism—targeted individuals, groups, social forces, and 
resources as preconditions of the market, which must be managed 
properly to foster the market’s optimal performance and growth. With 
recourse to the apparatuses of security, such management was 
ensured. Above all, economic growth in a competitive market would 
require persistent inequality in the distribution of resources among 
economic agents. 
 
4.2. American Neoliberalism 
 Despite the incongruity of conditions between postwar 
Germany and the postwar United States, American neoliberalism 
emerged, as in Germany, in reaction to Keynesian economic policy 
and the construction of a welfare state from the late 1930s through the 
postwar period. To be sure, many of the features of German 
neoliberalism described by Foucault approximated or were reflected 
in American neoliberal reason and practice. Still, the background 
conditions of American neoliberalism’s emergence differed markedly 
from those present in postwar Germany: liberalism has always been 
and continues to be the dominant current in American politics, 
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perhaps uniquely so. In the context of the United States, Foucault 
noted, “the demand for liberalism founds the state rather than the state 
limiting itself through liberalism” (Foucault 2010:217). American 
neoliberals clearly did not face a number of the entrenched obstacles 
confronted by their German counterparts; America’s liberal heritage 
in a sense eased neoliberalism’s emergence. And yet, something 
historically unique was indeed achieved in the establishment of an 
American neoliberal governmentality.  
Foucault articulated three features of American neoliberal 
reflection, which distinguished it from German neoliberalism on the 
one hand and the classical liberalism endemic to American politics on 
the other. These features were, respectively, the “epistemological 
transformation” of the object of economic analysis, the theory of 
human capital, and the generalization of the market-form (Foucault 
2010:222). Discussing each of these theoretical innovations in turn, 
this section highlighted those features of early American neoliberal 
reason and practice which have left their mark most imperiously on 
our historical present. Even when we did not call them by name, the 
artifacts of neoliberalism were familiar to us: they have been 
inscribed in our governmentality, embedded in our social practices, 
and invested in our conduct.  
 American neoliberalism first established a breach with 
classical economic analysis at the level of its object. We have already 
seen that the principle object of German neoliberal reflection was not 
the marketplace as a site of exchange but rather the mechanism of 
competition, viewed as a formal structure which guaranteed the 
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rationality of market activity. American neoliberals presupposed the 
German conclusions concerning competition, but proposed that the 
principle object of economic analysis should be neither the market as 
a space nor competition as a structure, but rather the economic 
decision-making processes of individuals. For the American 
neoliberals, economics must concern itself with “the way in which 
individuals allocate […] scarce means to alternative ends” (Foucault 
2010:222). Notably, the economic decision-making which formed the 
principle object of American neoliberal economic reflection may well 
be irrational and must therefore be studied in its human depth and 
local particularity, rather than through the construction of abstract 
models and deductive reasoning. As a sort of empiricism, economics 
was “no longer the analysis of the historical logic of processes,” but 
is rather “the analysis of […] the strategic programming of 
individuals’ activity” (Foucault 2010:223). This epistemological shift 
not only marked out the analytical field of American neoliberal 
thought. It represented the emergence of an entirely new economic 
subject—as an object of knowledge and manipulation—which would 
play a crucial role in the development of the theory of human capital. 
 The analysis of labor as human capital marked another major 
breach with classical economic reflection. To the extent that classical 
economy analyzed labor, it did so quantitatively, in terms of time. For 
the classical economists, productive labor was generally expressed as 
a duration of labor-time, an equation which Foucault termed the 
“Ricardian reduction,” in reference to David Ricardo, the classical 
theorist par excellence of labor-value (Foucault 2010:220). In the 
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classical view, labor was treated rather like an abstract, homogenous 
substance. If laborers were not entirely bereft of subjecthood, it was 
only to the extent that they were consumers. Labor as such, no matter 
how productive, was an object acted upon, and was never analyzed 
from within. Marx, like Ricardo, analyzed labor in an abstract manner, 
as labor-power which was forcibly reduced to a passive variable, 
indeed a commodity, seized by the process of capitalist exploitation 
and delivered to the mechanism of capital’s self-expansion. Even for 
early twentieth-century economists, such as Keynes, labor was 
figured as a passive or dependent variable of production and was 
therefore subject to a given rate of capital investment. For all these 
theorists, labor was fundamentally heterogenous vis-à-vis the 
economic forces which acted upon it.  
 The American neoliberals understood the abstraction of 
labor as an artifact of the analysis of labor offered by classical 
economy. Abstraction was neither the universal truth of labor nor the 
contingent effect of capitalist production. It was, quite simply, 
symptomatic of “the way in which these processes have been 
reflected in classical economics” (Foucault 2010:221). For the 
American neoliberals, a new analytic must grasp labor, not simply as 
an abstract force of production, but at the complex level of the human 
laborer as an economic actor, endowed with drives and inclinations, 
desires and interests. Labor must be analyzed in a qualitative rather 
than a quantitative manner, in order to avoid the abstraction which 
perturbed classical analysis. As a result, labor will no longer be 
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apprehended as heterogenous vis-à-vis capital; labor was itself an 
investment of a particular sort of capital—human capital.  
 In the theory of human capital, the act of laboring produced 
an income which formed the incentive for the laboring subject to labor. 
Income was not conceived as a wage, as in classical analysis, but 
rather as the return on the investment of one’s time, expertise, and 
body, to a given form of labor. Far from a passive subject acted upon 
by capital, the laborer was him or herself capital, with the potential to 
develop this capital in various ways and to various ends. Human 
capital could be invested; in fact, it was always invested in one way 
or another, and like all investments, this investment may be lucrative 
or disadvantageous. Production no longer appeared, as it did in 
classical analysis, as a meeting between an active and a passive 
force—labor and capital—but as a collaboration between individuals 
with human capital of greater and lesser value. As Foucault noted, in 
this frame each laborer “appears as a sort of enterprise for himself” 
(Foucault 2010:225). Thus, the economic subject, or homo 
œconomicus, of classical liberalism—homo œconomicus as a party to 
exchange—was completely replaced in American neoliberal thought 
by an essentially entrepreneurial homo œconomicus. As an economic 
enterprise unto herself, the laborer’s each and every move would 
henceforth be an economic decision regarding her status as human 
capital. 
The neoliberal analysis of labor as human capital dovetailed 
with the epistemological shift in the object of economic analysis, 
insofar as labor was no longer analyzed as an object operated on by 
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capital, but was rather an investment of human capital made by the 
living laborer, an economic subject who engaged in production and 
consumption for various reasons, and who above all made choices 
concerning investment and expenditure of his or her time and 
resources. This enormous shift—a shift which continues to define our 
historical present—invested every category of social life with new 
meaning: every choice concerning the self was an economic choice 
which bears on the dearness of one’s self as human capital. This is, of 
course, common knowledge to all of us today, whether or not we are 
familiar with the theory of human capital; one of the benefits of 
Foucaultian genealogy was its ability to reveal our accustomed ways 
of seeing in their radical historical specificity, so we might recognize 
them as strange. Education, training, health, ability, appearance and 
social relations, have all been radically reconfigured as elements in 
an imposing matrix of “investment” in human capital introduced by 
American neoliberal reflection (Foucault 2010:229). 
 In his analysis of the Freiburg School, Foucault noted that 
German neoliberalism instituted a “generalization of the enterprise 
form,” wherein the individual was rendered a “permanent and 
multiple enterprise” integrated in the social body (Foucault 2010:242, 
241). This analysis resembled Foucault’s remarks on the theory of 
human capital and the entrepreneurial nature of American 
neoliberalism; to be sure, the American neoliberal economic subject, 
as human capital, was structured as an enterprise. Still, Foucault 
asserted that American neoliberalism, in the most general sense, 
erected itself not through a generalization of the enterprise-form, but 
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through a “generalization of the economic form of the market” 
(Foucault 2010:243). This generalization was most clearly manifested 
in the tendency to subject those domains traditionally thought to fall 
beyond the purview of economics to economic analysis. American 
neoliberal reflection found market dynamics at work in all aspects of 
the social field; the market acted as the analytical paradigm through 
which all social processes were apprehended, interpreted and 
evaluated.  
We have already seen such economic evaluation in the 
government of the self as human capital. Foucault likewise noted that 
a “permanent criticism” confronted all government action and public 
policy with a matrix of economic cost-benefit analysis (Foucault 
2010:247). As in the case of German neoliberalism, such criticism did 
not furnish a laissez-faire categorical imperative for governmental 
non-intervention in the market. Instead, government policy must 
grasp those elements which condition the market and rigorously 
organize them according to the imperative of market expansion. 
Neoliberal analysis and critique of public policy furnished a 
“permanent economic tribunal confronting government,” wherein 
specific policies and initiatives were evaluated almost exclusively in 
the terms of the market, as well as in terms of their effects on the 
market (Foucault 2010:247). Public policy not only served, but 
mimicked, the organization of the market.3 Social relations, too, came 
 
3  A notable contemporary example of such mimesis was the commonplace 
implementation of “cap-and-trade” carbon emissions regulations, which articulate a 
“carbon market” within the market itself (see, Bailey 2007).  
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to be analyzed as if they were economies, as if all behavior were 
calculable in terms of cost and benefit. If American neoliberalism has 
transformed economic reflection, it has equally altered political 
practice and inscribed itself in our discourse. 
 The subjection of the personal, interpersonal, and social 
fields to economic analysis in American neoliberalism was given its 
most succinct and dramatic articulation by Gary Becker, an eminent 
American economist and neoliberal theorist of the Chicago School. 
For Becker, economic analysis could be used to analyze any 
circumstance in which an “individual’s conduct […] reacts to reality 
in a non-random way” (Foucault 2010:269). In Foucault’s reading of 
Becker, economics could be defined “as the science of the systematic 
nature of responses to environmental variables” (Foucault 2010:269). 
Implicit in this assertion was a total reversal of the picture of 
economic subjecthood which characterized classical economy. For 
economists in the classical tradition, homo œconomicus was a subject 
governed by her interests; as an agent, she must be free to pursue these 
interests through her voluntary engagement in economic affairs. 
Interests themselves, on this view, were as such beyond the reach of 
government; in classical economy, it was precisely insofar as the 
human subject is a homo œconomicus that she was beyond the reach 
of government.4 
 
4 This is not to suggest that society was uncontrolled or unmanaged in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries; on the contrary (Foucault 1979). Social forces were indeed 
controlled, but this control was suffused with a different meaning: elements such as 
crime, delinquency and vagabondage, if left to their own devices, would interrupt the 
 
38 
 
 For the American neoliberals, on the contrary, economic 
analysis could be applied to the individual in all her decision-making 
processes. These decision-making processes, insofar as they 
responded to the external world and not to obscure unreachable 
“interests,” could be directed and governed. The neoliberal homo 
œconomicus was precisely “the person who accepts reality or who 
responds systematically to modification in the variables of the 
environment,” and who was therefore “eminently governable” 
(Foucault 2010:270f). In American neoliberal economic reflection, 
economic subjects could be effectively managed by managing the 
variables which condition their interests and their decision-making 
processes. Advertising, as the government of individual economic 
interests, proliferated under neoliberalism. Yet such manipulation 
unfolded within the frame of security: the process of “programming” 
individuals in neoliberalism does not exactly correspond to an 
individualized protocol. Rather, individuals appeared as members of 
populations, classes, or “interest groups,” which were targeted as 
general forces. Even in our society of individuals, the individual 
tended to recede as the target of population management. 
Where classical analysis apprehended human beings as 
economic agents whose natural element was, as it were, the free 
market, neoliberal economic reflection concerned itself with the 
conditions which produced human beings as the sort of economic 
 
naturalness which reigned in the market. Under neoliberalism, on the contrary, the 
market is itself artificial, and social control constitutes one of its conditions of 
existence.  
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decision-makers they were, endowed with specific economic desires 
and interests. American neoliberal reason and practice, like its 
German counterpart, found its root principle in a market defined by 
competition. It apprehended the totality of the social field in a manner 
traditionally reserved for the market, approaching the category of 
labor in a qualitative rather than a quantitative manner. It 
foregrounded the concrete decision-making processes of individuals, 
who appeared in economic reflection as human capital. Further, 
American neoliberal reflection furnished a vision of economic 
subjects as immanently governable at the level of their interests. 
Foucault’s analysis powerfully demonstrated that American 
neoliberalism, like its German counterpart, should not be grasped as 
a simple resurgence of classical liberal themes. In a dramatic 
movement, neoliberalism erected itself through a series of reversals 
of classical liberal principles, while nevertheless inscribing itself 
within the horizon of the eighteenth-century art of the least possible 
government.  
 
Conclusion: Living the Neoliberal Present 
We no longer live in the post-Depression boom which 
prompted the rise of American neoliberalism. The 1970s brought the 
more or less complete liquidation of Keynesian economics, along 
with a pattern of welfare-state retrenchment that extended to the 
present day. Other crises have come and gone; their redress under 
neoliberalism has often been as exacting and deleterious as their 
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immediate effects. 5  Since Foucault’s writing, striking features of 
neoliberalism have emerged which remained marginal in his account: 
the proliferation of creditor-debtor relations and the ascendency of 
finance capital. Yet Foucault’s analysis remains prescient. It allowed 
us to see that neoliberalism was anything but a framework whose 
practical implication was a policy of laissez-faire. Neoliberal 
governmentality was an active governmentality, facilitating the 
market by governing those forces external to it but conducive to its 
stability and growth. Continuing privatization of medical care and the 
insurance against risk; increased privatization in education, policing 
and punishment, surveillance and defense; dependence on corporate 
contracting and private partnership within those goods still held in 
common: these were the policies or the effects of a governmentality 
whose object was economic expansion, and whose root principles are 
competition and inequality.  
 If neoliberal governmentality represented a dense network 
of policies and tactics, as Foucault suggested, it was indeed far 
removed from the laissez-faire classical governance which 
confronted a market ruled by the laws of nature. But if this is so, 
 
5 Unsurprisingly, the worst affected in the case of crisis are almost invariably those 
already marginalized. To cite just two examples: losses suffered between 2008 and 
2011 effectively widened the yawning wealth gap between Black and white households, 
a gap which expanded in the teeth of federal initiatives intended to stabilize the 
economy (Glaude 2016); what’s more, municipal debt and the curtailment of municipal 
and state spending in the post-2008 United States have precipitated waves of 
“extractive” policing, with disproportionate and calamitous effects on communities of 
color (Wang 2018:153). 
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neoliberalism was equally a network of points to which resistance 
may be applied. The market unearthed by classical analysis was 
defined by its inaccessibility; utilitarian reflection showed that market 
intervention was futile at best. But under neoliberalism, the market’s 
very existence demanded that formal structures be rigorously 
maintained to ensure competition and growth. The tactics through 
which neoliberalism produced and sustained such a market—the 
application of security techniques, the mechanisms of privatization, 
the generalization of the market-form, the government of interest and 
the production of self-governing subjects as human capital— were 
points of articulation that may equally be targets for tactical 
intervention. Under a neoliberal governmentality, a precise 
understanding of neoliberal reason and practice may enable us to 
better resist the structures governing the present.  
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Abstract: California is infamously known for its likelihood of 
environmental hazards such as flooding, landslides, air pollution, and 
forest fires which can be attributed to the natural climate of the area 
as well as anthropologically influenced climate change. Air pollution 
also posed potential threats and dangers to the civilians of California 
as increasing populations and uses of fossil fuels continued to 
contribute to the growing issue of climate change. The goal of this 
study was to examine and analyze the geospatial trends environmental 
hazards in California such as landslides, air pollution, flooding, and 
forest fires. A weighted test, zone and slope reclassifications, and 
quantified tests were conducted in order to study the effects of climate 
change on risk level in California. It was found that the greatest air 
quality and fire risk is located within Central Valley while fire and 
landslide risk showed opposite effects. Areas of high environmental 
hazard risk and low income were scattered amongst the state but 
mainly concentrated in the northern and eastern areas of California. 
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Introduction 
 California has been infamously known for its likelihood of 
environmental hazards such as flooding, landslides, air pollution, and 
forest fires which could be attributed to the natural climate of the area 
as well as anthropologically influenced climate change (Adams et al. 
2014; Harris 2017; Montgomery 2018; Hanson 2018). Air pollution 
also posed potential threats and dangers to the civilians of California 
as increasing populations and uses of fossil fuels continued to 
contribute to the growing issue of climate change (Benmarhnia 2017). 
Climate change additionally worsens air pollution, as ground-level 
ozone (O3) formed through reactions from sunlight and other air 
pollutants such as nitrous oxides. Ozone formation further accelerated 
under higher temperatures as well (Allen 2014). The effects of climate 
change that lead to dangerous natural events such as wildfires in 
California oftentimes created positive feedback loops that led to 
worsened conditions such as drought or inundation depending on 
regional circumstances (Barnard et al. 2018). Exposure to 
environmental disasters was also found to increase risk for long-term 
mental health disorders such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) and major depression (Lowe et al. 2015). Evidence suggested 
that lower income areas may be purposefully placed in locations that 
exposed them to more environmental disasters as well as lower air 
quality due to factors like environmental racism and a lack of political 
change (ESRI and Geiling 2015). 
The goal of this study was to examine and analyze the 
geospatial trends of environmental hazards in California such as 
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landslides, air pollution, flooding, and forest fires. We also compared 
the risk of these hazards to average income within California census 
tracts. Two research questions were inquired in this study: Where in 
California were people exposed to more environmental hazards? 
Additionally, were California areas with lower overall annual income 
more exposed to environmental hazards?  
 
Methods 
 In order to analyze risk of environmental hazards in 
California on a census-tract scale, we followed modified methods of 
Carver, Tricker, and Landres (2013) by creating ranks and weights of 
qualities to create a visual representation of a certain characteristics 
of the environment. In order to get a holistic perspective of 
environmental hazard risk, we quantified the risk of air pollution 
(specifically ozone and particulate matter) exposure, landslides, 
flooding, and fire by assigning specific properties of the hazards a 
risk-ranking from 0 (smallest risk) to 4 (highest risk). To finalize 
overall hazards risk, we did a weighted overlay analysis, combining 
the four environmental hazards. Finally, we compared individual and 
overall environmental hazards risk to income to determine if there 
was a relationship between risk and income.   
 To quantify flood risk, we reclassified the flood zones of 
California and assigned them a risk-ranking from 0 to 4 (Table 2). For 
the fire quality, we directly used the fire threat raster from the 
California Fire Resource Assessment Program (FRAP) that was 
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already classified into five classes based on severity of fire threat 
(Table 3). 
 To quantify landslide risk, we first reclassified the slope of 
California into a risk ranking (Table 4). To account for the influence 
of soil compaction and stability, we reclassified each land 
classification in the National Land Cover Database into five classes 
(Table 5). Because wildfires loosen soil and increase landslide risk 
(Montgomery 2018), we used the overall fire risk as a quality of 
landslide risk. To generate a holistic landslide risk character, we 
conducted a weighted overlay analysis, giving both slope and fire risk 
a weight of 40%, because a landslide is dependent on slope and fires 
can significantly increase landslide chances. We gave land cover a 
weight of 20%. 
To quantify risk to exposure of air pollution in California, 
we quantified the risk of exposure to both ozone and particulate 
matter PM2.5 microns. Ozone and particle pollution were selected as 
the two indicators of exposure to air pollution due to their direct and 
severe effects on human health: ground-level ozone can lead to 
respiratory deficiency and asthma while particulate matter can cause 
an increase in heart attacks along with other decreased lung functions 
(Environmental Protection Agency 2018). We assigned both ozone 
and PM2.5 a risk-ranking based on the amount of each in a daily 
maximum 8-hour period (Table 6; Table 7). We then conducted a 
weighted overlay analysis of these two pollutants, giving each equal 
ranking (50%) due to their high cost to human health.  
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To quantify the overall risk of environmental hazards in 
California, we conducted a weighted overlay analysis of all four 
environmental hazards. Specifically, we gave fire risk a weight of 
30% because of the high wildfire frequency of California and flood 
hazard a weight of 20% because the semi-arid climate results in little 
precipitation to cause much flooding (Barnard et al. 2018). 
Meanwhile, we assigned both landslide risk and air pollution risk a 
ranking of 25%, as they are subject to change but still have a rather 
impactful influence on the natural disasters that could occur within a 
given area (Barnard et al. 2018). 
In order to analyze the relationship between socioeconomic 
class and environmental hazards exposure risk, we used GeoDa to 
generate a standardized scatterplot of income versus overall natural 
hazards risk within the California census tracts. We selected the 
census tracts with both average to below-average income and average 
to above-average natural hazards risk so to evaluate spatial 
distribution of higher risk, poorer areas. We also created scatterplots 
of each of the four individual environmental hazards in comparison 
to income to closely analyze any possible correlations between each 
of the hazards to income that may affect the overall relationship.  
 
Results 
The severity of flood risk varied throughout California, as 
the greatest amount of risk lies along a vertical medial line of the state 
from the city of Red Bluff to Rosamond within Central Valley. The 
lowest areas of flood risk tended to cluster together such as the 
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southeastern region of California as well as several areas along the 
northern and eastern part of the state (Figure 1a.). Areas around the 
Central Valley between Red Bluff and Rosamond as well as part of 
southeastern California were least likely to be impacted by landslides 
and fires (Figure 1b., 1c.). The greatest air quality risk was located 
within Central Valley and the amount of risk gradually decreased in 
adjacent areas (Figure 1d.).  
In regard to overall environmental hazard risks, the areas of 
the lowest amount of risk included regions of southwestern California 
and a small number of northern areas at the northern end of Central 
Valley (Figure 2). The eastern edge of the valley and the southern 
areas of the state had the highest overall natural hazard risks (Figure 
2). There was not a clear spatial pattern of census tracts with average 
to above-average risk and average to below-average income (Figure 
3). There was not a clear relationship between any individual 
environmental hazard risk and income (Figure 4). There was also not 
a clear relationship between overall environmental hazard risk and 
income (Figure 5).  
 
Discussion 
Flood risk and air pollution risk were highest around the 
Central Valley region (Figure 1a., 1d). Fire risk and landslide risk 
were lowest in this region (Figure 1b., 1c.). Overall, the areas in 
California with the highest natural hazard risk bordered the Central 
Valley region (Figure 2). There was not a clear relationship between 
income and any or overall natural hazard risk (Figure 4, Figure 5). 
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There did not appear to be a clear spatial pattern of areas with average 
to above-average hazards risk and average to below-average income 
(Figure 3). 
Our results could be generally explained by the topography 
of the region. The Central Valley, for example, would have had a high 
flood risk due to its flat elevation (California Physical Map 2018). Its 
flat elevation also explained the low landslide risk. Additionally, the 
Central Valley was quite developed, minimizing the number of shrubs, 
trees, and grasslands that could have otherwise had high fire risk 
(Hanson 2018). In contrast, high fire risk areas were composed of 
more grasslands and shrubs that caused a positive feedback event of 
wildfires (Hanson 2018). Finally, the mountains surrounding the 
Central Valley could trap ground-level ozone and PM2.5 within its 
borders. (Irceline 2018). There was less air pollution risk along the 
western coast due to the strength and high frequency of coastal winds 
which pushed air pollution eastbound (Adams et al. 2014). In 
reference to overall risk, the relatively higher weight of fire risk 
(30%) and relatively lower weight of flooding (20%), may explain the 
high risk in the areas surrounding the central valley and the low risk 
within it. With landslide risk also incorporating fire risk, fire risk 
significantly impacted overall natural hazard risk.  
 Our overall results were not supported by previous studies. 
One study by Bolin, Boone, and Grineski (2015) found that affluent 
populations were oftentimes more exposed to certain natural hazards, 
such as flooding, as affluent populations could afford insurance to 
mitigate the risks while enjoying and affording the luxuries associated 
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with water-front property. The study also found that less affluent 
populations often resided near areas with high air pollution, as there 
is not any insurance that could mitigate the costs of this hazard (Bolin 
et al. 2015). Several other studies have found that lower-income 
communities were more exposed to air pollution, although other 
factors such as race also play a role in distribution (Brulle and Pellow 
2006; Marshall 2008; Clark et al. 2014). 
 Our study is important because it allows local governments 
to better prepare and mitigate environmental hazards. It is important 
to understand the geographic trends of environmental hazards in order 
to utilize the proper, necessary resources to help high-risk 
communities. This study was not without limitations. For one, we had 
to give a ranking of 0 (lowest risk) for areas with no data (such as 
areas with undetermined flood zones). Additionally, we had to 
simplify the criteria of risk for each natural hazard as there are an 
immeasurable number of factors that could influence flooding, 
landslides, and fires. However, in order to quantify the complexity of 
these hazards, we had to simplify the factors.  
To further this study, further research should include an in-
depth analysis into how varying the weights when quantifying 
individual natural hazards risk (such as flooding) as well as when 
quantifying the total environmental hazard risk in California will 
impact the findings. Further research should also incorporate 
additional environmental hazards, such as drought, to expand upon 
the current results. It would also be valuable to assess the relationship 
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of risk to natural hazards with other socioeconomic factors, such as 
race. 
 
Figures and Tables 
 
Table 1. Data sources 
 
Name Who Created Time Valid Description 
National 
Flood Hazard 
Layer 
FEMA 2018 Shapefile of flood data for 
California, including flood 
zones 
California 
Air Pollution 
2018 
Office of 
Environmental 
Health and 
Hazard 
Assessment 
2018 Shapefile of California 
with data of air pollution 
exposure (including but 
not limited to ozone and 
particulate matter 2.5), 
respiratory health diseases, 
and income 
National 
Land Cover 
Database 
2011 
USGS 2011 Raster of the land use types 
in California 
Fire Threat in 
California 
State of California 
Fire Resource and 
Assessment 
Program (FRAP) 
2005 Raster of fire risk in 
California. Created by 
combining fire frequency 
and potential fire behavior. 
California 
Shapefile 
State of California 2018 Shapefile of the state of 
California 
California 
90m DEM 
Data Basin- from 
NASA and NGA 
data 
2000 (An incomplete) Digital 
Elevation Model of 
California at 90-meter 
resolution 
California 
90m DEM- 
Tiles 
USGS 2013 Tiles of California and 
Arizona Digital Elevation 
Models to complete the 
California DEM 
California 
Census 
Tracts 
American Fast 
Finder 
2012-2016 Table of census data for 
census tracts of California, 
including but not limited to 
income data. 
California 
Census 
Tracts 
Shapefile 
US Census 
Bureau 
2010 Shapefile of California 
census tracts 
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Table 2. Rationale for Reclassified Flooding Ranking (Second Look 
Flood, N.d.) 
 
Flood Zone Rank Reason 
“Area not included”; “D” 0 “D” rankings are possible but undetermined 
flood hazard areas. 
“X” 1 Area of minimal or moderate flood hazard 
“A”; “A99”; “AE”; 
“AH”; “Open Water” 
2 Areas with a 1% annual chance of flooding or 
areas where clear base flood elevations 
“AO” 3 Area with a 1% or greater chance of flooding 
each years with an average depth of 1-3 feet 
“V”; “VE” 4 High risk coastal areas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. FRAP Fire Threat Rankings 
 
FRAP Value Our Rank Definition 
-1 0 Little to No Threat 
1 1 Moderate 
2 2 High 
3 3 Very High 
4 4 Extreme 
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Table 4. Rationale for Reclassified Slope Ranking (Clark et al. 
2018) 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Rationale for Reclassified Land Cover Ranking 
(Montgomery 2018) 
 
Land Cover Rank Reason 
Open water 
Woody Wetlands 
Perennial Snow/Ice 
0 Open water. High tree density in woody 
wetlands. Overall little soil to mass waste. 
Deciduous forest; 
Emergent herbaceous 
wetlands; 
Evergreen forest; 
Mixed forest 
1 High tree density keeps soils compact and 
prevents mass wasting 
Shrub/scrub; 
Developed High 
Intensity 
2 Shrub/scrub has some roots to stabilize soils; 
Little soil to mass waste in highly developed 
areas 
Cultivated Crops;  
Pasture/Hay; 
Developed Medium 
Intensity; Herbaceous 
3 Herbaceous, Cultivated crops, and pasture/hay 
lands have little roots to stabilize soils; A little bit 
of soil to mass waste in medium  
Developed Open 
Space; 
Low Intensity;  
Barren Land;  
Unclassified 
4 Developed Open Space, Low Intensity, and 
Barren land have little to no roots or structures to 
compact and stabilize soils. 
 
 
Slope 
Degrees 
Rank Reason 
0-1 0 Need some slope in order for a landslide to occur 
1-10 1 Steep slopes not a necessary prerequisite for landslides to 
occur. Gentle slopes at 1–2 degrees can also cause 
landslides 
10-20 2 Increasing slope allows for greater chance of mass 
wasting  
20-40 3 Major landslides are often associated with slopes from 20-
40 degrees 
40-83 4 Extremely steep 
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Table 6. Rationale for Reclassified Ozone Ranking* (ESRI and 
Geiling 2015) 
 
Ozone (ppm) Rank Reason 
0.026- 0.34 0 Equal interval division rounded based on EPA 
standard of 0.070 as acceptable ozone level, 
noticeable amounts and respiratory effects, painless 
0.3401 - 0.043 1 Uncomfortable patterns of breathing in some 
individuals  
0.04301- 0.051 2 Coughing and throat irritation, more frequent 
episodes of coughing  
0.05101 - 0.060 3 Chest pain, coughing, shortness of breath 
0.0601- 0.068 4 Meets upper end of EPA standard - chest pain, 
intense coughing, difficulty breathing for individuals 
both with and without asthma 
*Based on the amount of each in a daily maximum 8-hour period 
 
 
Table 7. Rationale for Reclassified Particulate Matter (PM2.5) 
Ranking* (EPA 2018) 
 
PM Rank Reason 
0 - 3.92 0 Equal interval division rounded based on range of 
0-19.60 PM2.5 annually in California using 7.89 
CA state average- particles linger in atmosphere 
and are breathed into lungs 
3.9201 - 7.84 1 Slightly more acidic waters and possible irritation 
of throat and eyes 
7.8401 - 11.76 2 Acidic waters and hazy air, depletes nutrients in 
soil  
11.7601 - 15.68 3 Exertion experienced by sensitive individuals with 
increased possibilities of the following: nonfatal 
heart attacks, irregular heartbeat, aggravated 
asthma, decreased lung function, increased 
respiratory symptoms  
15.6801 - 19.60 4 Lack of oxygen intake along with nonfatal heart 
attacks, irregular heartbeat, aggravated asthma, 
decreased lung function, increased respiratory 
symptoms, and premature death 
*Based on the amount of each in a daily maximum 8-hour period 
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Figure 1. Four Risks of Environmental Hazards in California 
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Figure 2. Overall Natural Hazard Risks in California 
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Figure 3. Overall High Environmental Hazard Risks Areas with 
Low Income in California  
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Figure 4. Scatterplots of Relationship Between Income and the Four 
Environmental Hazard Risks of Flood, Fire, Landslide, and Air 
Pollution. 
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Figure 5. Scatterplot of Relationship Between Income and Overall 
Natural Hazard Risk from Flooding, Fires, Landslides, and Air 
Pollution. 
62 
 
References 
 
Adams, Peter N., Barnard, Patrick L., Erikson, Li H., Eshelman,  
Jodi, Foxgrover, Amy C., Hapke, Cheryl, van Ormondt, 
Maarten, and Peter Ruggiero. 2014. “Development of the 
Coastal Storm Modeling System (CoSMoS) for Predicting 
the Impact of Storms on High-Energy, Active-Margin 
Coasts.” Natural Hazards 74(2):1095-1125. 
Allen, Jeannie. 2004. “Tango in the Atmosphere: Ozone and  
Climate Change.” NASA: Earth Observatory. Accessed 
December 9, 2018. 
https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/features/Tango.    
Barnard, Patrick L., Erikson, Li H., Espejo, Antonio, Hegermiller,  
Christie A., Limber, Patrick W., Mendez, Fernando J., 
O’Neil, Andrea, Ruggiero, Peter, and Katherine A. Serafin. 
2018. “Identification of Storm Events and Contiguous 
Coastal Sections for Deterministic Modeling of Extreme 
Coastal Flood Events in Response to Climate Change.” 
Environment Today 140(1): 316-330. 
Benmarhnia, Tarik. 2017. “Decomposition Analysis of Black-White  
Disparities in Birth Outcomes: The Relative Contribution 
of Air Pollution and Social Factors in California.” 
Environmental Health Perspectives 125(10): 1-7. 
Bolin, Bob, Boone, Christopher, and Sara Grineski. 2015. “Criteria  
63 
 
Air Pollution and Marginalized Populations: Environmental 
Inequity in Metropolitan Phoenix, Arizona.” Social Science 
Quarterly 2:130-157.  
Brulle, Robert J. and David Naguib Pellow. “Environmental Justice:  
Human Health and Environmental Inequalities.” Annual 
Review of Public Health 27(1): 103-124.  
California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. 2015.  
“California Metadata.” Accessed November 29, 2018. 
https://frap.fire.ca.gov/data/statewide/FGDC_metadata/fthrt
05_1_metadata.xml. 
Carver, Steve, Tricker, James, and Peter Landres. 2013. “Keeping It  
Wild: Mapping Wilderness Character in the United States.” 
Journal of Environmental Management 131:239-255. 
Clark, Lara P., Millet, Dylan B., and Julian D. Marshall. 2014.  
“National Patterns in Environmental Injustice and 
Inequality: Outdoor NO2 Air Pollution in the United 
States.” PLoS ONE 9(4): 1-8.  
Environmental Protection Agency. 2018. “Ozone Generators that are  
Sold as Air Cleaners.” Accessed November 28, 2018. 
 https://www.epa.gov/indoor-air-quality-iaq/ozone-
generators-are-sold-air-cleaners. 
ESRI and Natasha Geiling. 2015. “These Maps Help Explain the 
Numerous, Complicated Factors Behind Income 
Inequality.” Smithsonian Magazine. Accessed October 25, 
2018.  
64 
 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/these-maps-
help-explain-numerous-complicated-factors-behind-
income-inequality-180955941/.  
Geology.com. 2018. “California Physical Map: Elevation Data.”  
Accessed December 1, 2018. 
https://geology.com/topographic-physical-
map/california.shtml.  
Hanson, Chad T. 2018. “Landscape Heterogeneity Following High- 
Severity Fire in California’s Forests.” Wildlife Society 
Bulletin 42(2): 264-271. 
Harris, Ruth A. 2017. “Overview of the HayWired Scenario  
Earthquake-Hazards Volume.” California Geological 
Survey 1(1): 20-34. 
Irceline. 2018. “What is PM10 and PM2.5?” Accessed December 2,  
2018.  
http://www.irceline.be/en/documentation/faq/what-is-
pm10-and-pm2.5.   
Lowe, Sarah R., Sampson, Laura, Gruebner, Oliver, and Sandro  
Galea. 2015. “Psychological Resilience After Hurricane 
Sandy: The Influence of Individual- and Community-Level 
Factors on Mental Health after a Large-Scale Natural 
Disaster.” PLoS ONE 10(5):1-15.  
Marshall, Julian D. 2008. “Environmental Inequality: Air Pollution  
Exposures in California’s South Coast Air Basin.” 
Atmospheric Environment 42(21): 5499-5503.  
Montgomery, David R. 2018. “Deadly California Mudslides Show  
65 
 
the Need for Maps and Zoning that Better Reflect 
Landslide Risk.” The Conversation. Accessed October 25, 
2018. http://theconversation.com/deadly-california-
mudslides-show-the-need-for-maps-and-zoning-that-better-
reflect-landslide-risk-90087. 
Second Look Flood. N.d. “Flood Zone Definitions.” Accessed  
November 12, 2018. 
https://www.secondlookflood.com/floodzonedefinitions/.  
  
66 
 
 
 
 
 
Law’s Racism: The Perpetuation of Settler Colonialism in 
Ktunaxa v. British Columbia 
 
 
Christian Zukowski 
 
University of Alberta 
  
67 
 
Abstract: In considering the nexus between law, religion, and settler 
colonialism, I considered a case in which an Indigenous freedom of 
religion claim under section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms was ruled by the majority of Supreme Court of Canada 
as not being a valid freedom of religion claim. In examining this 
decision, I constructed an analytical framework through which I 
examined the decision in a way that considered the legal system in 
which it occurred, that legal system’s culture, and the relevance of 
land in this case. Using this analytical framework, I teased out why 
the Ktunaxa decision occurred in the way that it did, drawing on the 
discourse of both the majority and concurring arguments. I argued 
that the Supreme Court of Canada restricting what may validly be 
claimed as an infringement on the Charter’s guarantee to freedom of 
religion was an example of continuing settler colonialism that occurs 
within a political culture that, superficially, placed great emphasis on 
reconciliation with the Indigenous peoples that resided within its 
political-geographical confines. 
 
 
 
Keywords: religious freedom, Indigenous people, Ktunaxa v. British 
Columbia, land, legal culture, Canada 
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Introduction 
 By considering the nexus between law, religion, and settler 
colonialism, this paper embarked on an analysis of Ktunaxa Nation v. 
British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 
hereafter “Ktunaxa.” Ktunaxa was a case brought on by Indigenous 
peoples contesting a freedom of religion claim under section 2(a) of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This claim, however, 
was ruled by the majority in the Supreme Court of Canada as not 
infringing on the Ktunaxa Nation’s freedom of religion. In examining 
this Supreme Court decision, the motivations of this paper were 
twofold. The first was to construct an analytical framework through 
which I examined Ktunaxa in a way that considered the legal system 
in which it occurred, that legal system’s culture, and the relevance of 
land in this case. Second, using this analytical framework, I teased out 
why the Ktunaxa decision occurred in the way that it did, drawing on 
the discourse of both the majority and concurring arguments. In doing 
so, I argued that the Supreme Court’s decision of what may validly 
be claimed as an infringement on the Charter’s guarantee to freedom 
of religion reflected a legal system that divides suffering into that 
which was socially acceptable and that which was not; a process that 
reflected dominant social and legal cultural beliefs and values. In light 
of this, I also argued that the expansive approach taken by the Court 
to freedom of religion in Amselem v. Syndicat Northcrest should not 
be restrained. These were relevant conclusions for a multitude of 
reasons. Beyond exposing how the machinations of the Canadian 
legal system produced this decision, it also spoke more broadly about 
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Canadian political culture. Though I did not discuss this in detail in 
this paper, this case provided an example of continuing settler 
colonialism that occurred within a political culture that, superficially, 
placed great emphasis on reconciliation with the Indigenous peoples 
that reside within its geopolitical confines. 
 
Ktunaxa v. British Columbia: A Case Brief 
 Due to lengthy history of Ktunaxa, I have not recounted 
every detail of the case but rather provided an overview of the key 
components. According to the Supreme Court, the basic issues 
regarding the case, at paragraph 57, are as follows: 1) did British 
Columbia’s Minister of Forests’ decision to allow the Jumbo Valley 
Ski Hill development infringe upon the Ktunaxa’s section 2(a) 
freedom of religion and conscience?; and 2) did the Minister’s 
consultation with the Ktunaxa meet the requirements of s. 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982?6 
 The decision of the majority, at paragraph 75, found that the 
Ktunaxa’s claim did not fall within the scope of section 2(a) of the 
Charter. Further, at paragraph 115, the Court found that the 
Minister’s consultation efforts with the Ktunaxa were not 
unreasonable. The minority, led by Mr. Justice Moldaver, concurred 
in part with the majority, but found that the Ktunaxa did have a valid 
freedom of religion claim under section 2(a) of the Charter, but that 
 
6 Section 35 states that “[t]he existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal 
peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.” 
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this claim was justifiably infringed upon under section (1) of the 
Charter, which allowed for infringements of rights and freedoms in 
such a way that was justifiable in a free and democratic society. 
 
Constructing a Theoretical Framework  
Before considering Ktunaxa itself, I have laid out the 
analytic means through which the case was analyzed. I accomplished 
this by conducting a review of relevant literature on the legal system 
itself, the act of “law doing,” and the importance of land in this case. 
In doing so, I created a means by which to analyze the Court’s holding 
and ratio in Ktunaxa and examine the implications of how the 
decision was reasoned. This was not for the purpose of determining 
what is the right or wrong way to conduct an analysis in this case but, 
rather, to tease out why the ruling occurred as it did. 
 To determine the court’s reasoning, I selected the following 
academic sources from the literature, which I briefly preface here. In 
my review of the literature, I took a top-down approach, beginning 
with the legal system as a whole and narrowing my analytic focus as 
I moved through sources. As such, I began with Louis Wolcher’s 
(2006) conceptualization of the legal system as one that produced a 
“Universal Human Suffering” and in which suffering was divided into 
that which is just, and that which is unjust. Having situated those 
reading this paper in “the ultimate goal” of our legal system and 
considered the unintended consequences of how it operates, I next 
considered an article titled “Racism and the Innocence of Law,” by 
Patrick Fitzgerald (1987). Fitzgerald (1987) analyzed the Western 
71 
 
liberal legal system itself and considered the unintended 
reproductions of racism and inequality through its reliance on 
presuppositions of equality and individualism. Following this, I 
considered how the legal system itself constructed religion within its 
confines, drawing on the writings of Benjamin Berger (2010). Finally, 
I considered the issue of land, which was at the heart of Ktunaxa, by 
examining conceptualizations of ongoing colonization and how land 
was at “the crux” of this process. 
 In concluding this section, I drew upon these modes of 
analysis and unified them into a single paradigmatic model through 
which I was able to embark upon an analysis of Ktunaxa itself. In 
doing so, I recognized the risk of flattening the deep and insightful 
works of the theorists that I have mentioned. However, I hoped to 
preserve the essential qualities of the works that I drew upon in my 
analytical model to fully capture what it is to “do law” in the context 
of Ktunaxa. 
“Law-Doing” and the Division of Sorrows 
In his article, Wolcher (2006:364) puts forth a model of 
“Universal Human Suffering,” pictured below: 
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While Wolcher (2006) spoke in his article about Universal 
Human Suffering, specifically regarding human rights, this mode of 
analysis has been adapted to cases7 concerning Indigenous issues in 
Canada. I would here like to focus on the suffering identified as 
“Rejected by Law as a Basis for Legal Remediation” in Wolcher’s 
(2006) typology. Wolcher (2006:393) said that “[l]aw-doers divide 
people's suffering into two parts: suffering that is regarded as socially 
acceptable and suffering that is not.” He expanded on this central 
tenet of his essay by explaining that only those whose suffering was 
recognised by law-doers have the right to have their suffering taken 
seriously (Wolcher 2006:393). 
In creating this distinction, Wolcher (2006:361) was 
answering his own guiding question: “what is the ultimate task of the 
law.” This was an important conclusion to consider in this paper and 
beyond, but it also put forth the question: what is the nexus between 
law and society’s dominant cultural norms that created such a division 
 
7 See Hadley Friedland’s “Tragic Choices and the Division of Sorrows.” 
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of suffering? In order to answer this question, I considered the 
“culture” of the legal community and law itself in the next two articles. 
The Liberal Legal System and the Reproduction of Racism 
In his article, Fitzgerald told us that “[i]n liberal views of the 
world, law is manifestly incompatible with racism” (1987:119), and 
that “[l]aw is radically separate from 'material life'” (1987:121). 
Fitzgerald (1987:121) went on to say that self-interest, in a liberal 
system of law, must be constrained by universalistic legal and 
motivational structures. Setting aside for a moment the liberal legal 
system as a reproducer of racism, this act of situating his article within 
this perception was important. By doing so, Fitzgerald (1987) was 
pointing out a paradox within liberal legal systems: that despite 
discourses of universalism, equality under the law, and even a direct 
incompatibility with racism, law could and did reproduce racism. It 
was for this reason that the discourse of judicial decision makers 
became important, as it allowed for the breaking down and teasing 
out of racism. While such racism may not be intended, it was then of 
even greater importance to unmask these unintended and racist 
consequences of law doing. 
In considering “what” racism was in liberal and legal terms, 
Fitzgerald (1987:123-124) conceptualized racism as the “intentional 
wrongdoing inflicted by one individual on another.” Through his 
examination of the British Race Relations Act of 1976, Fitzgerald 
(1987:122) contended that “positive law acquires identity by taking 
elements of racism into itself and shaping them in its own terms.” In 
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his analysis of adjudications made under that Act, Fitzgerald 
(1987:128) stated that “[j]udges relate to the overall ordering ethos of 
community in such ultimate and revealing terms as what is ‘sensible’ 
and ‘reasonable,’ what conforms to ‘the fitness of things’ and to 
‘common sense.’” It was in this way that a universalistic system that 
operated on the foundation of equality of the individual was 
constrained: in the adjudication of disputes on the legal community’s 
ethos of what conforms to the “fitness of things.” 
To, perhaps, dilute Fitzgerald’s (1987) argument into a form 
suitable for this paper, the adjudication of disputes, even when 
concerning legislation with the express interest of combating racism, 
took into itself racism in that decisions were made on the basis of the 
perceptions of the adjudicators. This has the effect, as Fitzgerald 
(1987:131) noted, of reflecting the community of law’s evocation and 
reliance on a “racially-conceived society and nation.”  
Constitutional Horizons: Law’s Religion 
In the context of “law’s religion,” Berger (2010:35) 
conceptualized “constitutional horizons” as the means by which a 
concept (such as religion) was processed. For Berger (2010:35), these 
means were the values and assumptions of Canadian 
constitutionalism. In this way, Berger (2010:35-36) understood “that 
religion never appears to the law on its own cultural terms but, rather, 
is always rendered through the lens of the culture of the constitutional 
rule of law.” Expanding upon this, Berger (2010:36) contended that 
in this culturally defined conception of religion, it attracted the 
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protection of the law under certain conditions, those being that a 
religious claim concerns a private belief that impacts the autonomy 
and choice of individuals. 
This answers the question that I posed in the section 
considering Wolcher’s (2006) Universal Human Suffering theory 
concerning a nexus between law and culture in the division of 
suffering. This also expanded upon such an idea in a uniquely 
Canadian and religious context, by relating what form of law’s 
religion attracts legal protection in the case Alberta v. Hutterian 
Brethren of Wilson Colony. In doing so, Berger (2010:36) said that 
“the Court cements the centrality of choice in the logic of the 
constitutional protection of religion.” Berger’s analysis of culture’s 
law was thus two pronged. First, law processed concepts (including 
religion) through the values, assumptions, and meaning giving of 
Canadian constitutionalism. Second, and in light of the first prong, 
religious claims in particular focused on the individualistic and 
agency-oriented idea of choice: that if a person is able to choose to 
believe and manifest that belief, freedom of religion has been afforded 
to that individual or collective of individuals. 
The Importance of the (Settler Colonial) Construct of Land 
Land has long been recognized as central to the process of 
colonization. Joyce Green, an Indigenous political scientist, noted 
that colonization was a two-part process. It consisted of the physical 
occupation of someone else’s land, while simultaneously 
appropriating political authority, cultural self-determination, and 
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economic capacity (Green, 2003:52). Likewise, in an editorial on 
Settler Colonial Studies, Rowe and Tuck (2017:5) explained the 
significance of land in relation to colonialism in saying the following: 
 
Land is at the crux of the relationships between 
Indigenous peoples and settlers in settler societies. 
Ongoing occupation and settler pursuits of land are 
often made natural, logical, or invisible in settler 
societies. Settler societies often regard land only in the 
constructs of property or natural resource. Indigenous 
understandings of land predate and have codeveloped 
alongside and in spite of settler constructions of 
property. For Indigenous societies, land is peoplehood, 
relational, cosmological, and epistemological. Land is 
memory, land is curriculum, land is language. “Land”  
also refers to water, sky, underground, sea. 
 
Two things were apparent in this conceptualization of land. First, 
there was a disconnect between settler and Indigenous 
conceptualizations of land. Second, land clearly permeated the settler-
Indigenous relationship. Though this paper focuses on the religious 
freedom aspect of the Ktunaxa decision, land was both inextricably 
linked to the settler-Indigenous relationship and was an issue before 
the Supreme Court in this case. While the Court separated the issues 
into two distinct analyses, they were intertwined, and land became a 
consideration in the making of a religious claim. 
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A Paradigm to Analyze Ktunaxa  
 In combining the analytical frameworks above I was, again, 
cognizant of the dangers of flattening the work done by scholars in 
order to create a unified means of analysis for this case. In my review 
of literature, I began with Wolcher’s (2006) Universal Human 
Suffering: suffering is divided into that which is societally acceptable 
and that which is not. Following this, I examined Fitzgerald’s (1987) 
“Innocence of Law,” in which Fitzgerald (1987) concluded that 
adjudicators practice law in a way that reflected the way adjudicators 
think things ought to be and, in doing so, adopted racism into law’s 
identity. I then considered Berger’s (2010) constitutional horizon 
theory in which religion was defined on the basis of cultural values, 
assumptions, and the meaning-giving of Canadian constitutionalism. 
Finally, in considering land and processes of colonization, I found 
that land is at the crux of the settler-Indigenous relationship and 
permeated said relationship. 
 In combining the above, I seek to provide myself with a 
guiding question by which I will analyze Ktunaxa: considering that 
law divided suffering into that which is socially acceptable and that 
which is not, what are the values, assumptions, and constitutional 
cultures that inform the Supreme Court’s decision in this case and, 
specifically, what impact does the status of land as property have on 
the Court’s decision?  
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Ktunaxa v. British Columbia: Analysis 
In answering this question, I first considered the values, 
assumptions, and constitutional culture that informed the Court’s 
decision-making process. On the basis of this, I made a conclusion as 
to what “religion” and, therefore, what “suffering” the Court reasoned 
was (un)just. It was at this point that I analyzed, specifically, 
comments made by Moldaver J in his concurring opinion regarding 
land and property. 
Constitutional Values, Meanings, and Cultures 
In Berger’s (2010) article on section 1 analyzes, he 
considered comments made by McLachlin CJ in her opinion in 
Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony. While Berger’s 
(2010) analysis was made specifically in relation to section 1 analyses, 
I believe that the comment of McLachlin CJ spoke to the Court’s 
broader interpretational culture. Berger (2010:36) pointed out that 
McLachlin CJ, at paragraph 88, listed various Charter “values,” 
among which the most important value was liberty: that one can make 
a choice. This was also reflected in the majority’s writing in Ktunaxa. 
In applying case law on freedom of religion to Ktunaxa, the majority 
stated, at paragraph 68, that an applicant must first demonstrate 
sincere belief in a religious practice, and second that state conduct 
interfered with the applicant’s ability to believe or manifest belief in 
that practice in a manner that was not trivial or insubstantial (Ktunaxa 
v. British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource 
Operations), 2017). 
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In holding that the Ktunaxa Nation’s claim did not trigger 
section 2(a), the majority wrote at paragraph 70 that an “objective 
analysis of the interference caused by the impugned state action” must 
be conducted and that “the Minister’s decision does [not interfere 
with the Ktunaxa’s ability to believe in the Grizzly Bear Spirit or 
manifest that belief]” (Ktunaxa v. British Columbia (Forests, Lands 
and Natural Resource Operations), 2017). In making such an analysis, 
the Court was essentially duplicating what it did in Hutterian 
Brethren. In Ktunaxa, the impugned state action did not manifestly 
interfere with the Ktunaxa Nation’s ability to choose to believe or 
manifest belief in the Grizzly Bear Spirit. What it did do, however, 
was make such belief devoid of any subjective meaning, as Moldaver 
J pointed out at paragraph 133: 
If the Ktunaxa’s religious beliefs in Grizzly Bear Spirit 
become entirely devoid of religious significance, their 
prayers, ceremonies and rituals in recognition of 
Grizzly Bear Spirit would become nothing more than 
empty words and hollow gestures. There would be no 
reason for them to continue engaging in these acts, as 
they would be devoid of any spiritual significance 
(Ktunaxa v. British Columbia (Forests, Lands and 
Natural Resource Operations), 2017). 
The different opinions of the majority and Moldaver J highlighted a 
cultural rift in the Court that concerned the legal processing and 
construction of religion. Whereas the majority focused solely on the 
agency of individuals to believe and manifest belief in determining if 
a claim triggered section 2(a), Moldaver J considered the subjective 
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experiences of the individuals who lived this religion in that if the 
Grizzly Bear was no longer present, their beliefs and practices became 
“devoid of any spiritual significance.” 
Land as Private Property 
Though I had no way to determine the personal beliefs of the 
justices in the majority, it may also have been possible that broader 
cultural values informed their section 2(a) analysis. As noted in the 
section on the importance of land in this paper, “[f]or Indigenous 
societies, land is peoplehood, relational, cosmological, and 
epistemological. Land is memory, land is curriculum, land is 
language,” while, generally speaking, settlers conceptualise land as 
property and natural resources (Rowe and Tuck 2017:5). This settler 
conceptualization of land was even foregrounded in the analysis of 
Moldaver J under the Doré framework. In considering whether or not 
the State’s infringement of the Ktunaxa Nation’s freedom of religion, 
Moldaver J balanced granting the Ktunaxa the ability to effectively 
veto land developments versus their religious beliefs. It was not the 
objective of this paper to take a normative stance regarding the Doré 
analysis of Moldaver J, I instead wished to consider what was 
happening here more broadly.  
In essence, at issue here was the conflicting 
conceptualizations of property. In the analysis of Moldaver J, primacy 
was given to the settler conceptualization of land as property rather 
than that of something inextricably linked to religion. This was 
explicitly justified by the statement that a veto over the development 
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“gives the Ktunaxa the power to exclude others from developing land 
that the public in fact owns,” at paragraph 150 (Ktunaxa v. British 
Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 2017). 
It was important to remember at this point, that despite there being no 
proven claim, the land on which the development was proposed was 
unceded territory. This paper made no determination as to whether or 
not this fact should give the Ktunaxa an effective veto over 
developments, however, the conceptualization by Moldaver J of 
unceded land as something that the public owns was certainly 
illuminating in considering the importance of land in this decision. 
The Innocent Legal System and Universal Human Suffering 
 In his article, Fitzgerald (1987:131) stated that adjudicators 
evoke and rely on a “racially-conceived society and nation” in making 
decisions. I think, in considering the writing of Berger (2010), that 
this can be expanded beyond Fitzgerald’s (1987) contextual analysis. 
As I have highlighted in the previous sections on Ktunaxa, legal 
decisions makers do not merely rely on racial conceptions of society 
and nation, they relied on dominant conceptions of society and nation, 
such as religion and land in this case. It was here that legal decision 
makers processed religion and land “through the values, assumptions 
and meaning-giving horizon of Canadian constitutionalism” (Berger 
2010:35) and, as a result, suffering was divided into that which is 
justified and that which is not. 
 In Ktunaxa, this means that not only is the Ktunaxa Nation 
was denied legal remedy, but they were further denied recognition 
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that a valid religious claim even exists. This relegated their suffering 
to the sphere of suffering that was not recognized by society. While 
this may not have a practical impact in that infringements could still 
be justified under section 1 of the Charter, it certainly has a discursive 
impact in that the Ktunaxa were not only denied legal remedy, they 
were told that one did not exist because of an incompatibility between 
the means by which their belief was manifested and Canadian law’s 
construction of religion as one that was concerned with agency, not 
subjective practice. 
Implications and Conclusion 
 Berger (2010:31) metaphorically related legal systems to 
balloons in his article on section 1 analyses: “[l]egal systems are like 
softly inflated balloons: if you squeeze on one side, you can expect a 
bulge elsewhere.” This applied to religious freedom claims in the 
Canadian context in that if many claims pass the section 2(a) test for 
religious freedom claims, the analytical burden was placed upon 
section 1 of the Charter. It is because of my analysis of Ktunaxa in 
this paper and the reasons detailed here that I disagreed with the 
notion that placing the analytical burden on section 1 created a 
process that was excessively nebulous. 
 As has been shown throughout this paper and specifically in 
the case of Ktunaxa, since the ultimate goal of legal systems was to 
divide sorrows into those which are socially acceptable and those 
which are not, and since this process was informed by the legal and 
broader culture of society, restricting the ability of Indigenous 
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peoples to make claims under section 2(a) represents what dominant 
Canadian culture considers religion, thereby excluding claims that do 
not conform to that view. I argued that at the very least, in discursive 
sense, a broad and expansive section 2(a) analysis was required. 
While I recognised that the same dominant cultural understandings of 
legal issues may impact analyses under section 1, in such a case, at 
least there is a recognition that there was a valid claim and 
infringement by state action. In the aftermath of the Ktunaxa decision, 
Ktunaxa Nation Council Chair Kathryn Teneese relayed that “the 
decision leads First Nations people to feel they are ‘less than’ others 
in their rights and beliefs” (Harris 2017). While, as in the concurring 
opinion of Moldaver J, the Court may have held that the Ktunaxa’s 
religious freedom was proportionately balanced with the statutory 
objectives that guided the development approval process, at least 
discursively the Ktunaxa would have had their religious freedom 
claim legitimated.   
The importance of judicial discourse, particularly at the level 
of the Supreme Court of Canada, was recognized by Emmett 
MacFarlane in his dissertation on the Supreme Court. MacFarlane 
(2009:3) asserted that “judicial pronouncements on Charter rights … 
play a prominent role in shaping discourse around rights.” If Canada’s 
highest court could not recognize the suffering experience by the 
Ktunaxa peoples, we could not rely on this court to further 
reconciliation between the Crown and Indigenous peoples. While it 
might be argued that this essay nitpicks technical aspect of the Court’s 
decision, as MacFarlane (2009) posited, what our courts say about 
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rights influences our discussion of rights and therefore our discussion 
of who has the right to have their suffering recognized and who does 
not. This fact was of the utmost importance to reconciliation because 
not only does the Crown-Indigenous relationship need repair, but so 
to our relations as various peoples coexisting on the land, however it 
may be conceptualized in our respective ontologies.  
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